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Abstract
Franchising involves a variety of contractual and ownership arrangements within a
single company. In recent years, a great deal of e®ort has been made to understand this
increasingly popular organization (Lafontaine, 1992, 1993, and Lafontaine and Slade,
1997). There are at least two stylized facts that have posed challenges to the existing
theories of the ¯rm. One is the co-existence of company-owned and franchised units,
and the other is that franchisees make substantial amount of investment highly speci¯c
to their franchise companies.
We set out to explain both puzzles based on the importance of the brand name
in franchising (Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994). The e®ort to develop and maintain
the brand name changes over time and is di±cult to verify (Had¯eld, 1990), which has
two implications. One is that agents who run franchise units need to be given appro-
priate incentives for the brand-name-maintenance e®ort. The other is that franchising
contracts are incomplete. For incentive purposes, it is optimal to divide the agents
into two groups. Those in the ¯rst group (managers of company owned units) receive
a salary and focus on brand maintenance. Those in the second group (franchisees)
receive a share of the revenue in their own unit and focus mainly on unit speci¯c sales
e®ort (Bai and Tao, 2000). However, the franchisees should also be subject to a mini-
mum service standard that is crucial for brand name maintenance. The high-powered
incentive for the franchisees to increase sales revenue implies that they have a strong
tendency to divert e®ort from meeting the minimum standard. To discourage the fran-
chisees from doing so, they should be subject to severe penalty when found violating
the standard. We show that, to serve this purpose, it is optimal to have the franchisees
make investment highly speci¯c to their franchise companies.
Speci¯cally, the investment by the franchisee to buy physical assets (buildings,
equipment, etc.) can be viewed as a performance bond for the minimum standard.
If the franchisor controls the assets when the franchisee leaves the company, then the
franchisor has an incentive to opportunistically accuse the franchisee of violating the
standard and ¯re the franchisee, getting all the pro¯ts arising from the assets. If the
franchisee controls the assets, such opportunistic behavior of the franchisor will not
occur. Furthermore, if the assets are relationship speci¯c so that their value is very
low when detached from the brand name, then the franchisee will have strong incentive
not to violate the minimum standard, fearing of being deprived the right to use the
brand name in the event of violation.
Overall, the plural forms of contractual and control right arrangements in fran-
chising serve as a nexus of incentive devices for production involving brand-name-
maintenance e®ort in an incomplete contract framework.
Field: Contract Theory, Theory of the Firm
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1. Introduction
As arguably one of the most important organizational innovations of the last half century,
the franchise has motivated and challenged recent developments in the theory of the ¯rm.1
A franchise company typically has both company-owned units and franchised units, which
di®er in at least two important aspects: (1) Managers in the company-owned units have low-
powered incentive contracts, that is, they receive ¯xed wages. Managers in the franchised
units, however, have high-powered incentive contracts; they pay a portion of their revenue as
a royalty to the company and keep the remainder. (2) Managers in the company-owned units
do not own any assets of the units, whereas managers in the franchised units own part or all
of the units' physical assets.2 To explain such intra¯rm heterogeneity of organizational form,
we study a multi-agent, multi-task model where one of the tasks generates a public good |
the brand name in the context of the franchise. We show that it is optimal to o®er a mix
of high-powered and low-powered incentives to ex ante homogeneous agents. In addition,
corresponding ownership arrangements are chosen to make the revenue-sharing agreements
self-enforcing.
This study is inspired by the history of the development of the business format franchising
in the United States. The e±ciency and success of the McDonald brothers' California drive-
in made it possible for Ray Kroc (the founder of the McDonald's company) to sell the brand
name and the successful business format to would-be entrepreneurs (Love (1986)). Tom
Monaghan, the founder of Domino's Pizza, started selling the business of making pizza only
after years of perfecting the production process (Dicke (1992)). Indeed, in one of the earliest
litigations about business format franchising (Susser v. Carrel), the courts realized that \the
cornerstone of the franchise system must be the trademark or trade name of a product."3
Clearly, what is crucial to a business format franchise is the e®ort to develop and maintain
brand name products and services shared by all units of the company (henceforth, goodwill),
as well as the e®ort in production and distribution (henceforth, sales).
We consider a company that consists of the headquarters (HQ) and many units. The
1The multi-task theory of the ¯rm (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994)) rationalizes incentive
contracts of various power, while the incomplete-contracts theory of the ¯rm (Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995)) focuses on ownership structures.
2In 1986, the percentage of franchised units was 76 percent in McDonald's, and 82 percent in
Burger King (Lafontaine (1992)). Like most fast food chains, these are examples of the business
format franchise, which includes business format as well as (usually generic) goods and services. The
other type is the product franchise (such as car dealers) which involves complicated products and
services (Dicke (1992)). This paper focuses on the business format franchise, as the aforementioned
heterogeneity in organizational form is sharper in the business format franchise than in the product
franchise. Furthermore, both the number of the outlets of the business format franchisors and
the total nominal sales through them had phenomenal growth between 1972 and 1986 (Lafontaine
(1992)).
3Case studies reveal that the main reason for franchising is to o®er perspective franchisees a
strong brand under which to operate (Dnes (1992)). It has been found that franchised units su®ered
signi¯cant loss of revenue when their brand names were revoked (Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994)).
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manager of each unit performs two possible tasks, goodwill and sales.4 If a manager's payo®
is tied to the revenue of her unit with a high-powered incentive contract, she will allocate
too little of her e®ort on goodwill and too much of it on sales. This is because goodwill is a
company-wide feature and thus the manager can free ride on the goodwill provided by other
units, whereas the sales e®ort is unit speci¯c and the manager cannot rely on other units
for its provision. In contrast, if given a low-powered contract, then she is indi®erent to the
allocation of her e®ort between the two tasks and thus is willing to expend some goodwill
e®ort to the extent that it does not bring about disutility.5 Therefore, in order to induce
a goodwill e®ort, the company o®ers some of its managers low-powered contracts, despite
these contracts' adverse implications on overall e®ort level. With the goodwill provided by
these units, sales e®ort becomes more important in the remaining units of the company, and
high-powered incentive contracts are thus optimal. In a word, contract mix allows the HQ
to induce production of goodwill (public good) and at the same time capture its positive
externality within the company.
It is well documented that company-owned units are better than franchised units in
terms of quality of services and adherence to uniform standards.6 In addition, most (if not
all) franchisors require their units not to reveal to the public the ownership status (i.e.,
franchised or company-owned). These facts directly support our explanation of contract mix
in franchise. Moreover, our model can reconcile the existence of company-owned units with
the empirical ¯nding that the pro¯t margin under franchise ownership is much higher than
that under company ownership (Shelton (1967)). With the low-powered incentive contracts,
managers of company-owned units provide goodwill e®ort for the whole company at the
expense of sales e®ort that would enhance their own pro¯tability. Finally, when ex ante
heterogeneity is properly modeled, our explanation is consistent with the empirical ¯nding
that units located along highways are more likely to be franchised (Brickley and Dark (1987)).
With contract mix understood, it remains to be explained why managers with the high-
powered contracts own part or all of the units' physical assets whereas those with the low-
powered contracts do not. Our analysis on this issue is inspired by a stylized fact of the
franchise, namely, the incompleteness of franchise contracts (Had¯eld (1990)).7 When ex
ante contracts are incomplete about development and maintenance of brand name products
and services, they may become unenforceable ex post.
4For a business format franchise, goodwill has to be generated by managers who also engage in
sales activities. In contrast, for a product franchise, brand names of complicated goods and services
could be established independently. See Section 2 for discussion.
5Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we assume that the manager may exert e®ort up to
some limit without explicit incentives, and incentives are only required to encourage work beyond
that limit. See Footnote 12 of Section 2 for discussion.
6For example, Love (1986) documents that there were problems of quality and cleanliness in Mc-
Donald's franchised units (Chapter 4) and that the company-owned units were set up to \encourage
wayward McDonald's franchisees to clean up their act" (Chapter 9). Also see Lewin (1996).
7For example, \many of the standards with which a McDonald's franchisee must comply will
not even be articulated until well after the contract has been signed" (Had¯eld (1990)).
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From MacLeod and Malcomson (1993, 1996), we know that an ex ante contract could
become self-enforcing if the HQ and the manager have appropriate outside options. In
contrast to MacLeod and Malcomson's reliance on contractual remedies for outside options,
we focus on such roles of ownership arrangements. When the manager owns the asset, she
can deny the HQ access to it. Then, the HQ's outside option is to conduct business with
only the brand name, while the manager's is to provide generic goods and services. When
the HQ owns the asset, it can deny the manager access to both the brand name and the
asset. The manager thus does not have any outside option, while the HQ has the outside
option of capturing all the revenue. We show that, for their contracts to be self-enforcing,
managers with the high-powered contracts need to own their units' physical assets whereas
those with the low-powered contracts should not. We further show that, in our setting,
optimally chosen contractual remedies cannot mimic what the ownership arrangements have
achieved.
It is generally held that, because the value of franchisees' assets depends crucially on the
access to their company brand names, franchisees are extremely vulnerable to franchisors'
opportunistic behavior. However, empirical studies by Kostecka (1987) found that in 1985
franchisors terminated 2,651 units, which equals only .87 percent of the estimated 301,689
units of business-format franchise companies existing then. It is interesting to note that this
puzzle could be easily explained by our theory of ownership structures in the franchise.
This paper is built upon the multi-task theory and incomplete-contracts theory of the
¯rm. Compared with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994), this paper incorporates the
possibility that one of the many tasks is of public good nature. Heterogeneity in task
importance is then endogenously determined, and contract mix is optimal even for ex ante
homogeneous units of the company.8 Compared with Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990), this paper considers revenue-sharing contracts in the setting of contractual
incompleteness and explores other roles of ownership. In particular, the optimal ownership
structure is chosen to make the ex ante contracts self-enforcing rather than to provide direct
ex ante e®ort incentive. Furthermore, the optimality of the contract mix implies multiple
ownership arrangements of complementary assets.9
Gallini and Lutz (1992) also o®er an explanation of contract mix in franchise. Their
signalling theory that the franchisor owns some units to reveal its private information about
pro¯tability is probably more relevant to new franchises (Lafontaine (1993) and Lafontaine
and Shaw (1996)). Lutz (1995) attempts to explain the ownership structures in a franchise
by allowing only short-term contracts. She shows that managers with low-powered contracts
should own their units, while those with high-powered contracts should not.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a multi-task model where
there is no contractual incompleteness. In Section 3, the HQ's contract design problem is
8When all tasks are of private good nature, optimality of contract mix depends crucially on ex
ante heterogeneous task importance (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994)).
9Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) discuss incomplete contracts with multiple tasks in a di®erent
context. In particular, they exclude the possibility of revenue-sharing contracts, and focus on how
ownership structure a®ects the allocation of an agent's attention among her various tasks.
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studied, and the optimality of the contract mix is established. In Section 4, by incorporating
contractual incompleteness into our model, we show that incentive contracts of various power
can be self-enforcing only in the presence of corresponding ownership structures as observed
in a franchise. The paper concludes with Section 5. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Production technology
Consider a company (or chain) that consists of the headquarters (HQ) and many units. To
highlight the free-rider problem, we assume that there are in¯nite identical units. Further-
more, for simplicity, we assume that the units are indexed by i 2 I = [0; 1].
The manager of each unit performs two tasks: s and g. s is a unit-speci¯c e®ort that
a®ects only the revenue of the unit, and g is a general e®ort that increases the revenue
of all units of the company. For a fast food chain, for example, s is the sales e®ort, and
g is the e®ort to develop customer goodwill towards the brand name of the chain, or to
learn about customer tastes, or to develop new products. Other examples concern employee
hiring and training. s could be the e®ort to hire employees who are quick and able to follow
existing production procedures exactly, while g is to hire employees who like to develop new
production processes. s could also be the e®ort to train employees to have e±cient services,
while g is the e®ort to train employees to pay attention to customers' need and come up
with new products. From now on, we will call s the sales e®ort and g goodwill. The level of
the two e®orts are not veri¯able and hence cannot be contracted on.
We assume, however, that the revenue of each unit is veri¯able, as is the case for fast
food chains.10 Furthermore, it is given by
x(i) = y(s(i); G) + ²(i);
where ²(i) is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance ¾2, ² is
independent across units, and G =
R
I g(i)di is the total stock of goodwill possessed by the
company. The speci¯cation of y assumes that g is a pure public good. We also assume that,
Assumption 1 y is increasing and concave in (s;G).
Though the analysis of the model is made most clear-cut by the assumption of in¯nite
units and the pure public good nature of g(i), the qualitative features of our main results
remain when the company has ¯nite units and/or goodwill has local e®ects. We will discuss
the relaxation of these assumptions in Subsection 3.6.
The manager incurs a private cost of c(s; g) to provide these e®orts. We assume that
these e®orts are perfectly substitutable in the manager's cost function and that e®ort is not
10In Section 4, we will consider scenarios where sales revenue may not be veri¯able under certain
conditions.
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costly before it reaches a certain level.11
Assumption 2 The cost of e®orts s and g is c = c(s + g) and there exists some positive
number T such that c0(t) = 0 for t  T , c(T ) = 0, and c0(t) > 0, c00(t) > 0 for t > T .
It is clear that we adopt a multi-task model pioneered by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
However, we emphasize the di®erence in the scope of in°uence of the two tasks, whereas they
focus on the di®erence in the measurability of the tasks.
2.2. Incentive contracts
We assume that the manager has constant absolute risk aversion. That is, the manager's
utility function is u(z) = ¡e¡rz, where r is the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion and
z is the manager's net (but risky) payo®. The HQ is assumed to be a risk-neutral pro¯t
maximizer. The HQ chooses a compensation scheme to induce the manager's e®orts.
Although all managers are identical ex ante, the HQ can o®er them di®erent contracts.
Without losing generality, we consider two types of contracts: (1) a ¯xed-wage contract, and
(2) a high-powered contract that rewards the manager according to the revenue of her own
unit.12
Let wi(x(i)) be the incentive contract for the manager of unit i. Then the manager's
expected utility is assumed to take the form
u(CE) ´ Efu[wi(x(i)) ¡ c(s(i) + g(i))]g;
where CE is the manager's certainty equivalent money payo®, and E is the expectation
operator. Given the incentive contract, the manager chooses s(i) and g(i) to maximize
U(CE).
11We follow Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in using this cost function. They argue that \[i]n one-
dimensional agency models, it is typically assumed that the agent will not work without incentive
pay. The reason for this is not that the agent dislikes even small amounts of work, but rather that
the level of work the agent would provide without explicit incentives does not a®ect the optimal
solution. In multitask models, however, the fact that agents supply inputs even without incentive
pay can be quite consequential." Indeed, the managers could be restricted from engaging in other
activities. With nothing else to do, they might as well spend their time on sales and goodwill.
Furthermore, monitoring could be e®ective in enforcing e®ort up to a certain level and incentive
pay is only needed to induce e®ort beyond the level.
12One may argue that the HQ could also write: (a) a contract that rewards the manager based
on the revenue of other units, or (b) a contract that rewards the manager based on the revenue
of other units as well as on that of her own unit. Because there are in¯nite identical units, each
unit is so small relative to the whole company that its level of goodwill does not a®ect the total
stock of goodwill of the company. Furthermore, revenue is stochastically independent across units.
Therefore, the revenue of other units does not contain any information about the manager's e®orts
and thus should not a®ect her compensation. Refer to Holmstrom (1982).
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To summarize, the timing of events is as follows.
(1) At t=0, the HQ chooses contract wi(x(i)) for all i 2 I.
(2) At t=1, managers choose their sales and goodwill e®orts simultaneously.
(3) At t = 2, the revenue is realized and the contracts are implemented.
3. Contract Mix
3.1. Contract design problem
In this analysis, we constrain the HQ to the choice of linear contracts. There is no loss of
generality though. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal incentive contract
in suitably stationary dynamic environments in which the agent can continuously monitor
her own performance is equivalent to the optimum of a reduced-form static model in which
the principal is constrained to linear contracts.
For wi = ®(i)x(i) + ¯(i) where ®(i) and ¯(i) are constants unrestricted in sign, we have:
CE(wi) = ®(i)y(s(i); G) + ¯(i)¡ c(s(i) + g(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2:
At t = 1, given the contracts o®ered by the HQ, f(®(i); ¯(i)) : i 2 Ig, the managers
choose (s(i); g(i)). Speci¯cally, taking G as given, the manager of unit i solves
max
s(i)¸0;g(i)¸0
CE(wi):
If ®(i) > 0, the manager of unit i chooses g(i) = 0 and
s(i) = arg max
s(i)¸0
®(i)y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i)): (OP ¡ s)
This is because, in this case, the manager has an incentive to increase the revenue of her
unit. The optimal way to do so is to allocate no e®ort to goodwill and all her e®ort to
sales, as her goodwill e®ort has only an in¯nitesimal e®ect on the revenue of the unit while
sales e®ort has a non-trivial positive e®ect. An incentive contract with ®(i) > 0 is called
a high-powered contract. A manager who receives a high-powered contract is called an H
manager, and her unit an H unit.
If the manager of unit i receives a ¯xed-wage contract (®(i) = 0), then she puts a total
level of T e®ort (i.e., s(i) + g(i) = T and c(T ) = 0) and is indi®erent between the sales
and goodwill e®orts. This is because, in contrast to the case of ®(i) > 0, the manager's
payo® does not depend on the revenue of her unit and consequently not on how her e®ort
is allocated between the two tasks. Therefore, when ®(i) = 0, the manager is assumed to
do what is requested by the HQ among the set of Oi = f(s(i); g(i)) : s(i) + g(i) = Tg. An
incentive contract with ®(i) = 0 is called a low-powered contract. A manager who receives
a low-powered contract is called an L manager, and her unit an L unit.13
13It is never optimal to have a negative ®.
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The above discussion shows that the HQ can induce a goodwill e®ort only by o®ering
managers ¯xed-wage incentive contracts; there is discontinuity in the provision of the good-
will e®ort. The fundamental reason for this result is that goodwill is of public good nature,
which implies that the e®ect of a manager's goodwill e®ort on the revenue of her unit is
generally smaller than that of her sales e®ort. It follows that, so long as the manager's
income depends on the revenue of her unit, she will not fully take into account the exter-
nality of her goodwill e®ort and will provide too little goodwill. The HQ can overcome the
under-provision of goodwill e®ort only by delinking a manager's income from the revenue of
her unit.
Let p be the proportion of L units and L = [0; p] µ I be the set of L units. Then
G =
R
L g(j)dj and the HQ's expected total pro¯t is
¦ =
Z
L
[y(T ¡ g(j); G)¡ w(j)]dj +
Z
I¡L
[(1¡ ®(i))y(s(i); G)¡ ¯(i)]di;
where g(j) is the level of goodwill e®ort chosen by the HQ for the L unit with index j and s(i)
is the level of sales e®ort chosen by the manager of the H unit with index i . At t = 1 (given
p, fw(j)gj2L and f®(i); ¯(i)gi2I¡L), taking fs(i)gi2I¡L as given, the HQ chooses fg(j)gj2L
to maximize ¦, i.e.,
fg(j)g = arg max
fg(j)g
¦: (OP ¡G)
In summary, at t = 1, fs(i)gi2I¡L and fg(j)gj2L are jointly determined by (OP ¡ s) and
(OP ¡G).
At t = 0, the HQ chooses p, fw(j)gj2L and f®(i); ¯(i)gi2I¡L to maximize the expected
total pro¯t, subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (i.e., (OP ¡ s) and (OP ¡G))
and to the individual rationality constraints that managers are willing to accept the contracts.
We normalize the reservation utility of the managers to be 0. Then, the HQ's problem at
t = 0 is to choose p, f®(i); ¯(i)gi2I¡L, and fw(j)gj2L to
max
Z
L
[y(T ¡ g(j);G)¡ w(j)]dj +
Z
I¡L
[(1¡ ®(i))y(s(i); G)¡ ¯(i)]di (OP ¡HQ)
s:t: (OP ¡ s); (OP ¡G) (IC)
w(j) ¸ 0 for all j 2 L
®(i)y(s(i);G) + ¯(i)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2 ¸ 0 for all i 2 I ¡ L: (IR)
Since w(j) and ¯(i) do not a®ect the incentive compatibility constraints, the individual
rationality constraints must be binding at the optimum. Otherwise, the HQ's expected total
pro¯t can be increased by reducing w(j) or ¯(i). By substituting constraints (IR) into the
objective function, the HQ's optimization problem at t = 0 is simpli¯ed as:
max
p;f®(i)gi2I¡L
Z
L
y(T ¡ g(j); G)dj +
Z
I¡L
[y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2]di (OP ¡HQ0)
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s:t: (OP ¡ s); (OP ¡G): (IC)
In order to analyze the HQ's contract design problem, we ¯rst characterize some necessary
conditions for the optimal incentive contracts (Subsection 3.2) and then investigate the
equilibrium outcome given the incentive contracts (Subsection 3.3).
3.2. Uniformity of high-powered and low-powered incentive contracts
Our ¯rst result regards the uniformity of L units.
Proposition 1 The HQ should request the same level of goodwill e®ort from all L managers.
fg(j)g is chosen at t=1 to solve program (OP¡G). Given any p and f®(i)i2I¡Lg, this can
be done in two steps: (1) Given G, choose the optimal allocation fg(j)g so that R g(j)dj = G;
(2) Choose the optimal G. Note that, for given G, the second term of the objective function
of (OP ¡ G) is independent of the allocation fg(j)g. Therefore, step (1) is equivalent to
maximizing
R
L y(T ¡ g(j); G)dj. Since y(T ¡ g;G) is concave in g, an application of Jensen's
inequality implies that it is optimal to choose the same g(j) for all L units.
To characterize the optimal incentive contracts further, we make additional assumptions
about the production and cost functions.
Assumption 3 lims!0 ys ´ @y(s;G)@s = 1, and limG!0 yG ´ @y(s;G)@G = 1.
Assumption 4 c
0(s)
ys(s;G)
is convex in s.
Assumption 5 The marginal product of goodwill e®ort, yG ´ @y(s;G)@G , is increasing and
concave in s.
Assumption 3 is made to avoid possible complications of corner solutions. Assumption 4
holds if the cost function is su±ciently convex. In the case that the production function is
Cobb-Douglas and the cost function is c = (s + g)¸, it is satis¯ed if ¸ is su±ciently large.
Assumption 5 says that s and G are complementary and the return to s in enhancing the
marginal product of G diminishes.
By Proposition 1, Assumptions 1 and 3, we have
Lemma 1 Program (OP ¡HQ0) is equivalent to
max
p;f®(i)gi2I¡L
py(T ¡ g;G) +
Z
I¡L
[y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2]di (OP ¡HQ00)
s:t: pyG(T ¡ Gp ; G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ; G) +
R
I¡L(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G)di ¸ 0 (IC ¡G)
®(i)ys(s(i); G) = c0(s(i)) (IC ¡ s)
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Program (OP ¡ HQ00) can be solved in three steps: (1) Solve for ®(i) from constraint
(IC ¡ s) and substitute it into the objective function and other constraint; (2) Given G and
p, solve for the optimal fs(i)g; (3) Solve for the optimal G and p. By Lemma 1, Assumptions
4 and 5, we can show that step (2) is a concave program.
Lemma 2 Let ®(i) = c0(s)=ys(s;G). Then, given G, the integrand in the objective function
of program (OP ¡HQ00),
y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2;
and the integrand in constraint (IC ¡G),
(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G);
are both concave functions of s(i).
Lemma 2 and an application of Jensen's inequality imply,
Proposition 2 The HQ should o®er the same high-powered contract to all H managers.
Proposition 2 is more involved than Proposition 1 because, in contrast to the L managers,
both the sales and total e®orts by the H managers are directly a®ected by the high-powered
incentive contracts, as is the HQ's choice of goodwill level. Instead of o®ering a single high-
powered contract, the HQ could o®er two contracts, one less high-powered and the other
more high-powered, under which one group of H managers would decrease their sales e®ort
and the other increase their sales e®ort. When the cost function is not convex enough, the
decrease in sales e®ort is not too much while the increase in the sales e®ort is quite a lot,
and the HQ could bene¯t by o®ering di®erent high-powered contracts. However, when the
cost function is su±ciently convex (speci¯cally, when Assumption 4 is satis¯ed), o®ering the
same high-powered contract increases the average sales e®ort of the H managers. When s
and G are complementary as Assumption 5 says, this also increases the HQ's incentive to
choose a high level of goodwill.
Empirical studies by Lafontaine and Shaw (1996) show that, while they vary from one
franchisor to another, franchise contracts are extremely uniform across franchisees and stable
over time within any particular franchise company. McAfee and Schwartz (1994) o®er a
market-based explanation for this phenomenon. Speci¯cally, in their model, after signing a
contract with one franchisee, a franchisor is tempted to o®er another franchisee a contract
with a lower royalty rate to undercut the ¯rst franchisee and therefore obtain a higher
lump-sum fee. Knowing the franchisor has such opportunistic behavior, the ¯rst franchisee
is reluctant to accept the contract, and the franchisor is thus better o® by committing to
a uniform contract for all franchisees. Note that in our set-up, each manager is a local
monopoly and McAfee and Schwartz's argument is no longer applicable. Our model thus
o®ers an alternative and purely technological explanation for the uniformity of franchise
contracts.
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3.3. Equilibrium outcomes given the uniform contracts
Propositions 1 and 2 greatly simplify the contract design problem (Subsection 3.1). Let (w)
be the low-powered contract o®ered by the HQ to all L managers, and g is the goodwill
e®ort. Let (®; ¯) be the high-powered contract o®ered by the HQ to all H managers, and s
is the corresponding sales e®ort.
Recall that, at t = 1 (given p, (w) and (®; ¯)), H managers choose s and the HQ picks
g. For ® > 0, H manager's optimal choice of s is characterized by
®ys(s;G)¡ c0(s) = 0: (FOC ¡ s)
The HQ's objective function at t = 1 becomes
¦1 = p[y(T ¡ g;G)¡ w] + (1¡ p)[(1¡ ®)y(s;G)¡ ¯]; where G = pg:
For p > 0, the HQ's optimal choice of g is characterized by
pyG(T ¡ G
p
;G)¡ ys(T ¡ G
p
;G) + (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yG(s;G) = 0; (FOC ¡G)
where the left hand side of the equation is equal to @¦1
@G
. Thus, at t = 1 (given p, (w) and
(®; ¯)), equilibrium (s;G) are determined simultaneously by (FOC ¡ s) and (FOC ¡G).
By the concavity of y, it is a standard exercise to show that, for ® > 0 and p > 0, the
Jacobian matrix of (FOC ¡ s) and (FOC ¡G) has a positive determinant. Then, we have,
Lemma 3 For ® > 0 and p > 0: (1) Equilibrium s and G are di®erentiable functions of
(®; p). (2) Equilibrium s and G both increase (or decrease) with p if @
2¦1
@p@G
> 0 (or @
2¦1
@p@G
< 0):
(3) The e®ects of ® on equilibrium s and G are usually ambiguous.
Regarding the boundary cases, for p = 0, G = pg = 0 and s is determined by
®ys(s; 0)¡ c0(s) = 0:
For ® = 0, s and G are de¯ned as:14
s(0; p) = lim
®!0 s(®; p) and G(0; p) = lim®!0G(®; p):
Then, we can show,
Lemma 4 s and G are continuous functions of (®; p) on [0; 1]2.
14In proving Lemma 4, we also show the existence of these limits.
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To conclude our analysis in Subsections 3.2-3.3, note that the HQ's objective function at
t = 0 becomes:
¦0(®; p) = py(T ¡ G
p
;G) + (1¡ p)[y(s;G)¡ c(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2®2]; (1)
where s and g are the equilibrium de¯ned by (FOC ¡ s) and (FOC ¡G), and functions of
(®; p). By Lemma 4, ¦0(®; p) is a continuous function of (®; p) on [0; 1]2. The HQ chooses
® and p to maximize ¦0(®; p). The Weierstrass Theorem then implies,
Corollary 1 The optimal (®; p) exists.
3.4. Characterization of the high-powered contract
When the HQ chooses ®, it considers several factors. First, as ® increases, H managers are
subject to more risk and therefore need to be compensated more. Second, the value of ®
a®ects the HQ's incentives to provide goodwill e®ort and H manager's incentives to expend
sales e®ort. Di®erentiate ¦0 with respect to ® and simplify the derivative with (FOC ¡ s)
and (FOC ¡G). We have, for ® > 0,
d¦0
d®
= ¡(1¡ p)r¾2®+ ®(1¡ p)yHG
dG
d®
+ (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yHs
ds
d®
; (2)
where a function with a superscript H means that it is evaluated at (s;G). On the right
hand side of (2), the ¯rst term captures the risk factor and is negative, and the next two
terms describe the e®ects of ® on ¦0 through G and s, respectively.
Proposition 3 For any p 2 [0; 1), the optimal ® 2 (0; 1).15
The intuition for this result is quite clear. To induce e®ort from H managers, the HQ has
to o®er them a positive ®. To commit itself to choosing a high level of goodwill e®ort, the
HQ needs ® < 1 so that it still cares about the e®ect of goodwill e®ort on H units' revenues.
3.5. Characterization of contract mix
By equation (1), the HQ's total pro¯t is ¦0 = p¼L+(1¡p)¼H , where ¼L ´ y(T¡ Gp ; G) is the
HQ's expected pro¯t from a L unit, and ¼H ´ y(s;G)¡ c(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2®2 is the HQ's expected
pro¯t from a H unit. If ¼L and ¼H were independent of p, then either a high-powered contract
or a low-powered contract would be o®ered by the HQ to all managers (namely, either p = 0
15For the case p = 0, the proposition needs the additional assumption that y(s; 0) 6= 0. Note
that ¦0(0; 0) is de¯ned to be lim®!0¦0(®; 0). At p = 0, Proposition 3 says that there exists some
®0 2 (0; 1) such that lim®!0¦0(®; 0) < ¦0(®0; 0).
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or p = 1). The contract mix (namely, p 2 (0; 1)) would only be optimal with probability
zero when ¼L = ¼H .
In this model, however, goodwill is a public good. In addition, only L managers can
provide a goodwill e®ort. This seems to justify the existence of L units as they have positive
externality on other units of the company. On the other hand, L managers, because of the
low-powered contract, expend a lower level of total e®ort than H managers (s(j) + g(j) = T
for j 2 L, whereas s(i) ¸ T for i 2 I ¡ L), which makes the L units less pro¯table. Intuition
therefore suggests that the HQ o®ers a high-powered contract to some managers and a low-
powered contract to the others.
To investigate the optimality of contract mix, for p > 0, we di®erentiate ¦0 with respect
to p and simplify the derivative by (FOC ¡ s) and (FOC ¡G).
d¦0
dp
= (¼L ¡ ¼H) + (1¡ p)®yHG
@G
@p
+ (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yHs
@s
@p
+ gyLs ; (3)
where a function with a superscript H (L, respectively) means that it is evaluated at (s;G)
((T ¡ G
p
;G), respectively).
When there is one more L unit, the HQ gains ¼L but loses ¼H . The ¯rst term on the
right hand side of (3) captures this direct e®ect. Proposition 4 says that this direct e®ect is
negative.
Proposition 4 For any given p 2 (0; 1), ¼L < ¼H at the corresponding HQ's optimal choice
of ®.
There are two reasons for the result of Proposition 4. One is that, to induce goodwill
e®ort, the HQ is constrained to o®ering the low-powered incentive contract to L managers.
As a result, L managers expend a lower level of total e®ort than H managers. The other
reason is that H managers free ride on L managers for goodwill and therefore they are able to
put more e®ort on sales. Both reasons stem from the public good nature of goodwill e®ort.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 is supported by empirical ¯ndings (Shelton (1967)).
Proposition 4, however, does not imply that there should be no or very few L units. L
units are important because they are the only providers of goodwill e®ort, which not only
increases pro¯ts of all units directly, but also a®ects the productivity of sales e®ort in H
units. The second and the third terms on the right hand side of (3) capture, respectively,
the e®ect of p on ¦ through total stock of goodwill and that through the level of sales e®ort
of H managers. The signs of these two terms are the same as those of @G
@p
and @s
@p
respectively,
and are therefore ambiguous by Lemma 3.
When p 6= 1, the burden of providing a given level of goodwill, G, is borne entirely by L
units. Because the sales e®ort has decreasing returns to scale, the cost of L units devoting less
e®ort to sales exceeds the bene¯t of H units being able to exert more e®ort in sales. Having
more L units mitigates such ine±cient substitution between sales and goodwill e®orts across
units. This substitution e®ect is captured by the fourth term on the right hand side of (3)
and is always positive.
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Note that, if y(s; 0) = 0 for all s, the optimality of p¤ > 0 is straightforward. Speci¯cally,
at p = 0, G = 0 and ¦ = 0; but at p > 0, G > 0 and ¦ > 0. Therefore, the optimal p must
be positive. Intuitively, if the revenue vanishes in the absence of goodwill, then the HQ must
have the L units to provide the essential input.
Our analysis, however, is focused on the scenario that y(s; 0) > 0. It is then not so
apparent that the optimal p has to be positive. In that case, a su±cient condition for p¤ > 0
is d¦
dp
> 0 as p! 0, which we can show under the following assumption.
Assumption 6 If y(s; 0) > 0 for s > 0, then ysss ¸ 0 and lim(s;G)!(0;0) ys(s;G) = 1.
Assumptions 1, 3, 5, and 6 (all about the revenue function) are satis¯ed by the functions
of y(s;G) = c0saGb + c1s± + c2G´, with c0, c1, and c2 non-negative as well as a, b, ± and
´ between 0 and 1, which include Cobb-Douglas functions as special cases. Note that, in
terms of the importance of G to the revenue function, Assumption 6 imposes much fewer
restrictions than y(s; 0) = 0 does. Furthermore, Assumption 4 is satis¯ed if y takes the
above form and the cost function has the form of c = (s+ g)¸ with a su±ciently large ¸.
Lemma 5 If y(s; 0) 6= 0, then limp!0 @¦@p > 0 for ® < 1.
This, together with Lemma 4 and Proposition 3, implies that
Proposition 5 It is optimal for the company to have some L units.
Having established the optimality of p¤ > 0, we turn to the question of when it is optimal
for the HQ to have some H units, namely, p¤ < 1. With L units providing the goodwill, the
HQ can o®er managers of the remaining units high-powered incentive contracts and thereby
elicit high sales e®ort from them. Whether or not high-powered incentive contracts should
be o®ered to some manager depends on the magnitudes of their costs and bene¯ts.
One cost of high-powered incentive contracts is that they subject the managers to risks,
resulting in ine±cient risk sharing between the risk neutral HQ and the risk averse managers.
The cost is lower when the managers are less risk averse or when there is less uncertainty.
The main bene¯t of high-powered incentive contracts is that they elicit a high sales e®ort
from H managers. When the marginal costs of sales e®ort are lower, it is easier to induce it
and thus the bene¯t of high-powered contracts is higher. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 6 It is more likely for the HQ to have H units when the managers are less risk
averse, or when the uncertainty about the revenue is smaller, or when marginal cost of e®ort
is smaller.
Proposition 6 gives one set of conditions for the HQ to have H units, namely, H units are
attractive enough. A complementary set of conditions is that L units do not perform very
well. With low-powered incentive contracts, the total level of e®orts is T . If T is very small,
the pro¯ts from L units are very low. Therefore, we have:
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Proposition 7 It is more likely for the HQ to have H units when T is smaller.
3.6. Discussion
Before concluding this section, we discuss the pure public good assumption and the in¯nite
unit assumption. Then we argue for the consistency of our model with the evidence on the
locational distribution of di®erent types of units.
3.6.1. Finite units and local e®ects of goodwill
When g is not a pure public good (equivalently, g has some local e®ect), the managers will
admittedly have more incentives to develop goodwill. However, they still will not take into
account the positive externality of goodwill on other units and thus will not do enough for
goodwill. In fact, so long as the local e®ect of goodwill e®ort is not extremely strong, it
is still optimal to give some units low-powered incentive contracts so that their managers
are more willing to provide goodwill than they would when they had high-powered incentive
contracts.
When there are only ¯nite units, the optimal reward to a manager could depend on the
revenue of other units and this, admittedly, will give the manager some incentives to develop
goodwill.16 However, for such incentives to be strong enough, the share of the manager's
income from the revenue of other units must be large enough. Such a high share brings
about a high cost of risk and has to be compensated by substantially lowering the share of
income from the revenue of the manager's own unit.17 Therefore, the incentives for sales
e®ort will be greatly reduced. In summary, inducing goodwill e®ort by linking the manager's
reward to the revenue of other units is very costly in terms of sales e®ort. It is still better
to generate goodwill by giving some managers low-powered incentive contracts.
3.6.2. Highway evidence
Since Rubin (1978), the franchise has been considered as a way of dealing with managers' in-
centive problems rather than raising money from small investors. Assuming that the goodwill
is already established, the choice between company units and franchised units is in°uenced
by the following two concerns: (1) company managers are more likely to put in low level of
e®ort (the shirking problem), (2) franchisees have more incentive to substitute low quality
products (the free-rider problem). What is implicit in the above discussion is that the shirk-
ing problem is much less severe for franchisees as they have high-powered contracts, while
16In this context, a high-powered contract links the manager's reward more closely to the revenue
of her own unit than to that of other units, whereas a low-powered contract links her reward only
to the total revenue of the whole company.
17Roughly speaking, a one-percentage-point increase in the share of revenue from other units
needs to be compensated by a
p
N -percentage-point decrease in the share of revenue from her own
unit, where N is the number of units in the company.
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the free-rider problem is much less severe for company managers as they have ¯xed wages.
When a unit is away from its monitoring center (HQ), the shirking problem becomes
severe if the unit is company-owned. This implies that company ownership is more likely for
units that are closer to the monitoring center. On the other hand, when a unit is situated in
an area (such as a highway) where there are a lot of non-repeat customers, then the free-rider
problem is serious if the unit is franchised. This suggests that, compared with other units,
highway units are more likely to be company owned. Brickley and Dark (1987) formally test
the above two hypotheses, but they ¯nd support only for the ¯rst one. In particular, they
¯nd that highway units are more likely to be franchised. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994)
also discuss the tension between their theoretical predictions and the highway evidence.
Note that, in our model, the goodwill is endogeneously generated. Speci¯cally, company-
owned units are chosen for the production of goodwill, whereas franchised units are used to
reap the bene¯ts of company goodwill. In other words, the HQ is fully aware of the low
goodwill e®ort in the franchised units, and it is simply not optimal for the HQ to induce
same goodwill e®ort in all units. This implies that the free rider problem (which is a®ected
by the percentage of non-repeat customers) itself is not that crucial so long as the HQ can
enforce the minimum quality standard (i.e., g is non-negative). More importantly, when
units are heterogeneous, our model would predict that company ownership is more likely for
those units that have more advantage in generating goodwill and that the HQ is located
near those units to alleviate the shirking problem of the company managers.
Consider again that there are many types of customers (highway, residential, downtown,
etc.). We want to argue that highway units do not have more advantage in generating good-
will than downtown stores, which could then explain the highway evidence. Our argument is
based on how goodwill or brand name is established. Conceivably, for goodwill production,
a company needs to ensure that its initial customers like the products and then \spread"
favorable impressions to those who have not purchased the products. To achieve maximum
impact, it is important that those initial customers are from various submarkets and there-
fore they can spread their impressions to a wide population of the society. We believe that
the downtown units serve more diverse customers than the highway units. For example, for
a Boston Common McDonald's, the customers could be tourists or business people of other
cities as well as people who live in the vicinity of the Boston Common. Even truck drivers
who usually frequent highway McDonald's may bring their kids to the Boston Common on
Sundays. The rest of the argument follows immediately.
It is important to our argument that there are many types of customers, only one of
which is highway customers. If the whole market were highway customers and downtown
customers, then it would be optimal to have some company owned units along highways to
spread positive impressions directly among such a large group of customers.
We have argued that the downtown units are in better position to spread positive im-
pressions about existing brands than highway units. The same argument also works for
product development. Note that, for the HQ to assess the marketability of a new product, it
is important to get feedback from a diverse group of customers at fewest number of stores.
As argued above, the downtown units tend to have more diverse customers and therefore
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they are natural candidates for company ownership.18
4. Ownership and Contract Enforceability
The above analysis has addressed the ¯rst distinguishing feature of a franchise, namely,
that both high-powered and low-powered incentive contracts are used. What remains to
be explained is why managers with the high-powered incentive contract own some or all of
their units' physical assets whereas those with the low-powered incentive contract do not. In
this section, we ¯rst discuss a stylized fact of franchise, namely, incompleteness and hence
unenforceability (by third parties) of ex ante incentive contracts. We then show that the
incentive contracts of various power can only be voluntarily enforced, and hence the desirable
incentives be protected, in the presence of the corresponding ownership arrangements.
4.1. Contractual incompleteness in a franchise
A basic assumption in Sections 2 and 3 is that contracts are complete. The HQ o®ers the
low-powered incentive contract to some managers who provide the goodwill e®ort, and the
high-powered incentive contract to others who expend all their e®ort on sales. Once these
contracts are written, the HQ is no longer needed for carrying out the business.19 In this
complete-contracting framework, it does not matter whether the units' physical assets are
owned by the managers or by the HQ.20
In reality, the retail markets for the HQ's brand name products and services are signif-
icantly uncertain. The HQ needs to set the standards and policies to be followed by the
franchisees in response to market changes in order to develop and maintain its brand name.
For example, when new scienti¯c studies reveal that some of the food ingredients are not
healthy enough, the HQ (of a fast-food business) may choose to replace those ingredients. To
write complete contracts with the managers, it requires the HQ to foresee all possible future
contingencies and devise corresponding strategies for the managers, which is very costly if
not impossible. As a result, \many of the standards with which a franchisee must comply
will not even be articulated until well after the contract has been signed," and \the key
characteristic of the franchise contract is its incompleteness" (Had¯eld (1990)).
Rather than writing complete contracts ex ante, the HQ retains the residual rights of
control to make business decisions ex post as unforeseen contingencies arise (Grossman and
18This argument seems to imply that the signaling theory is also consistent with the highway
evidence, as downtown stores serve more diverse customers and would then provide better signal
about pro¯tability. However, downtown stores only provide signal about the average pro¯tability
of all stores, whereas a potential franchisee prefers signal about stores of the same type as hers.
The best way for the company to signal is to own units in each of the submarkets.
19Note that contracts could be complete though the goodwill and sales e®orts are not veri¯able.
See Hart (1995).
20Throughout the paper, we assume that the HQ owns the goodwill stock. This is in fact an
optimal arrangement. We will further discuss this after Proposition 10.
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Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995)). An examination of the McDonald's
franchise contract reveals that the HQ has substantial residual rights of control, and that its
franchises are required to \strict adherence to licensor's standards and policies as they exist
now and as they may be from time to time modi¯ed." A recent example is the outbreak of
mad cow disease and the subsequent decision by McDonald's of not using UK beef.
While the residual rights of control greatly facilitates the HQ to develop and maintain
its brand name in response to market changes, it also gives the HQ an opportunity to hold
up the managers ex post. A HQ may investigate \a minor or curable contract violation not
to promote the quality of its franchisees but to achieve some other, opportunistic goal at
the franchisee's expense," or abuse its power \in order to transfer the franchises to more
pro¯table franchisees or to convert the outlets to company ownership" (Had¯eld (1990)).
It should be stressed that the objective of this paper is not to probe why franchise
contracts are often incomplete. There is an extensive body of legal studies on this issue (see
Had¯eld (1990) and references therein). Among the reasons suggested are the importance
of brand name products and services, the uncertainty of the retail markets, and the need for
quick responses to possible market changes. See also Anderlini and Felli (1994), Hart (1995),
MacLeod (1996a, 1996b), Maskin and Tirole (1996), and Segal (1995) for the theoretical
foundations of the incomplete-contracts approach. What this paper attempts to show is
that, given the contractual incompleteness in a franchise, the ex ante incentive contracts of
various power can be voluntarily enforced only in the presence of the corresponding ownership
arrangements.
4.2. Unenforceability of ex ante contracts
In the presence of contractual incompleteness, disputes between the HQ and the managers are
inevitable. Moreover, contractual incompleteness makes it di±cult to verify which party is at
fault and implement penalties for breach of ex ante incentive contracts.21 This implies that
ex ante contracts may become unenforceable ex post, and renegotiation could be initiated
by either the HQ or the managers.
Accordingly, the timing of events is modi¯ed as follows (see also Figure 1). At t =
0, the HQ designs the high-powered and low-powered contracts and chooses the contract
mix ratio (p).22 It also makes ownership arrangements for the units' physical assets. At
21In her seminal paper, Had¯eld (1990) reviews several cases on franchise contracts (Picture Lake
Campground v. Holiday Inns, 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980). Vaughn v. General Foods
Corp., 797 F.2d 1407, 1411, 1415 (7th Cir. 1986)) and concludes that the courts have taken the
so-called business judgment approach. Speci¯cally, the courts treat the \franchisor's interest as
if it represented the entirety of the relation." As a result, the franchisors could always come up
with some business justi¯cation for termination of franchise contracts and therefore do not need
to pay any penalty to the franchisees. As for franchisees, they certainly have the freedom to leave
the relationship voluntarily; however, under the business judgment approach, they don't expect to
receive any payment from the franchisors except for getting back the value that is attached with
their asset investment.
22In the following analysis, we consider scenarios where it is optimal for the HQ to o®er some
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t = 1, the managers choose s and g simultaneously. We call this the investment stage
of the game. We maintain the assumption that, if a manager is indi®erent between some
choices, she will choose the one most preferred by the HQ. At t = 2, potential revenue
becomes known to the HQ and the manager. They then have the option to sever their
relationship. They decide whether to sever the relationship, and if not, whether to renegotiate
the revenue-sharing contract. We call this stage of the game the renegotiation stage. As
there is perfect information at his stage, renegotiation takes a negligible amount of time.
After the renegotiation stage, production is carried out. We normalize the length of the
entire game to be 1 and assume that the period before t=2 is of length 1 ¡ ¿ 2 [0; 1) and
that after t=2 is thus of length ¿ .23
We adopt MacLeod and Malcomson's (1993) speci¯cation and analysis of the renegoti-
ation stage of the game. In MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), both a no-trade and outside
option could be the triggers for contract renegotiation. In our model, however, trade is always
preferred by both parties to no-trade, and the only possible trigger for contract renegotia-
tion is the outside option. Let u denote the HQ's stage payo® under the ex ante incentive
contract, and v denote that of the manager. Let u0 be the HQ's stage payo® from the
outside option, and v0 be that of the manager. u0 and v0 are determined by the ownership
arrangements in Subsection 4.3, and they can be speci¯ed by contracts in Subsection 4.4.
We obtain the following equilibrium of the renegotiation subgame.
Proposition 8 (MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)) Suppose u + v > u0 + v0. The
payo®s to the HQ and the manager in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation
subgame are given by U and V , where ½ is the interest rate,
½V = u+ v ¡ ½U; (4)
½U =
8><>:
u+ v ¡ v0; when v0 > v;
u0; when u0 > u;
u; otherwise.
(5)
Proposition 8 shows that, whenever the manager (or the HQ) has higher payo® from the
outside option than from the ex ante incentive contract, the renegotiation is initiated and
the manager (or the HQ) obtains her outside option payo® under the new incentive contract.
4.3. Ownership and self-enforcement of ex ante contracts
It was shown in Subsection 4.2 that, depending on the outside options of the HQ and the
managers, the revenue-sharing contracts (designed at t = 0) could be renegotiated (at t = 2)
thereby distorting the e®ort incentive of the concerned parties. In this subsection, we assume
away any contractual remedies for the event of an outside option. The parties' payo®s under
managers the high-powered contract (i.e., p¤ < 1).
23As long as the incentive contract is not renegotiated after the uncertainty is resolved, the
argument for linear contracts still applies (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)).
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the outside option are thus determined solely by the ownership arrangements of the units'
physical assets. We show that appropriate ownership arrangements at t = 0 can ensure
voluntary self-enforcement of the ex ante contracts at t = 2. In the next subsection, we
conclude our analysis by showing that the contractual remedies, even optimally chosen,
cannot mimic what the ownership arrangements do. Taken together, we can explain not
only multiple ownership arrangements of a franchise but also their correspondence with the
incentive contracts of various power.
Recall that, in the complete-contracting framework as described in Section 3, the HQ
o®ers the high-powered incentive contract (®¤; ¯¤) to some managers and the low-powered
incentive contract (w¤) to others. These contracts induce the second-best sales e®ort s¤
and goodwill e®ort G¤ = pg¤. In the incomplete-contracting framework considered here,
the same ex ante contracts would generally lead to ine±cient equilibrium sales and goodwill
e®orts, denoted by se and Ge respectively, as the ex ante contracts may be renegotiated. Our
objective is to ¯nd ownership arrangements under which, in the subgame perfect equilibrium,
(se; Ge) coincides with the second-best (s¤; G¤) and no renegotiation occurs. Such ownership
arrangements, if they exist, are said to make the ex ante contracts (®¤; ¯¤) and (w¤) self-
enforcing.
Before we analyze individual cases, note that the managers' e®orts are not human capital
in our model. Once the goodwill and sales e®orts are made by the manager of a unit, the
former is attached to the company's brand name while the latter is embedded in the unit's
physical asset.
Also note that the HQ could make a lump-sum payment w1 to the manager between
the investment stage and the renegotiation stage.24 Then the promised lump-sum payment
to the manager in the production stage becomes ¯¤ ¡ w1 for the high-powered contract, or
w¤ ¡ w1 for the low-powered contract. A proper choice of w1 may reduce the pressure for
renegotiation.
In Section 3, we harmlessly normalized the manager's reservation wage to 0. In this
section, the reservation wage rate is not neutral and is denoted by w0.
(A) We ¯rst turn to the question of whether ownership arrangements can ensure self
enforcement of the high-powered contract (®¤; ¯¤). Under this contract, for the production
period, the manager is promised a payment of ®¤y(se; Ge) + (¯¤ ¡ w1) while the HQ is to
get (1¡ ®¤)y(se;Ge)¡ (¯¤ ¡ w1).
(A1) Suppose that the manager owns the unit's physical assets.25 In this case, the
manager's outside option is either to provide generic goods and services without access to
the company goodwill (y(se; 0)) or to work for another company and get her reservation
wage (¿w0).
26 On the other hand, the HQ's outside option is y(0; Ge) ¡ ¿w0 (where the
24The payment has to be a ¯xed amount, as the revenue is not veri¯able yet.
25It can be checked that the cost of asset ownership is unimportant to the following analysis and
is thus assumed to be zero.
26For the clarity of argument, we assume that there is no uncertainty about the revenue, i.e.,
¾ = 0, and restrict the discussion to linear incentive contracts. Note that in Section 3, uncertainty
20
HQ pays ¿w0 to hire a new manager for the production stage) as it will lose access to the
e®ort-embedded physical asset.
Lemma 6 Suppose that the manager owns the physical assets. The H contract is self-
enforcing if conditions
max
s
fy(s; 0)¡ c(s)g+ w1  ®¤y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤) + ¯¤ = w0; (6)
¿w0 + w1 < ®
¤y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤) + ¯¤ = w0; (7)
max
g
fpy(T ¡ g; pg) + (1¡ p)y(0; pg)g 
py(T ¡ g¤; G¤) + (1¡ p)[y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤)] + (1¡ p)(w1 + ¿w0 ¡ w0): (8)
are met.
(6) implies that the manager can not bene¯t from leaving to work for herself with her
asset at t=2 even if she chooses s optimally for this purpose. (7) means that neither can
the manager bene¯t from leaving to work for other employers at t=2. (8) means that the
HQ can not bene¯t from kicking out H managers even if it directs the L managers to choose
the optimal g for this purpose. Together, the three conditions ensure that the second-best
s¤ and G¤ will be chosen and renegotiation will not occur.
(6), (7) and (8) are implied by strong complementarity between s and G, and high
e±ciency of the production technology. To parameterize complementarity and e±ciency, we
consider the following class of revenue functions:
y(s;G) = kz(s;G) + k1¹(s) + k2º(G);
where z(0; G) = z(s; 0) = ¹(0) = º(0) = 0, @
2z
@s@G
> 0, z, ¹ and º are increasing and
concave. z(s;G) captures the complementarity between s and G, and thus k parameterizes
the strength of the complementarity. k also parameterizes the e±ciency of the production
technology. We can show:
Lemma 7 Let k1 = k2 = 0. Then for su±ciently large k, there exists some w1 such that
(6)-(8) hold with strict inequality.
Lemma 8 Suppose for some k and w1, (6)-(8) hold with strict inequality as k1 = k2 = 0.
Then (6)-(8) also hold for su±ciently small k1 and k2.
Corollary 2 For su±ciently large k and su±ciently small k1 and k2, there exists some w1
such that (6)-(8) are satis¯ed.
plays no essential role other than rationalizing linear incentive contracts if we assume that the HQ
cannot take a negative share of any unit's revenue and thus the shares of any unit's revenue going
to the managers must total no greater than one. All the results in Section 3 except Proposition
6 still hold. The discussion in Subsection 3.6 can also be modi¯ed so that it does not depend on
uncertainty.
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(A2) Suppose instead that the HQ owns the unit's physical assets. In this case, the HQ
can deny the manager access to the company goodwill and the e®ort-embedded physical
assets. The manager has the outside option of working for another company and getting her
reservation wage (¿w0), while the HQ has the outside option of hiring a new manager and
capturing all the revenue (y(se;Ge)¡ ¿w0).
A necessary condition for the contract to be self-enforcing is that, when (s¤; G¤) is chosen,
neither party wants to renegotiate. By Proposition 8, this is equivalent to:
®¤y(s¤; G¤) + (¯¤ ¡ w1) ¸ ¿w0;
(1¡ ®¤)y(s¤; G¤)¡ (¯¤ ¡ w1) ¸ y(s¤; G¤)¡ ¿w0:
These inequalities imply that w1 = ®¤y(s¤; G¤) + ¯¤ ¡ ¿w0. Given such w1, however, the
manager will deviate from s¤. By choosing s0 = T , the manager gets w1 before the realization
of the revenue and ¿w0 after the renegotiation, and her total payo® is w1 + ¿w0 ¡ c(T ) =
®¤y(s¤; G¤)+¯¤ = w0+c(s¤), which is higher than her payo® of w0 by choosing s¤. Therefore,
the H contract is not self-enforcing when the HQ owns the physical assets. Combining (A1)
and (A2), we have:
Proposition 9 For su±ciently large k and su±ciently small k1 and k2, the high-powered
incentive contract (®¤; ¯¤) is self-enforcing ex post if and only if the manager owns the unit's
physical assets.
In other words, when s and G are strongly complementary and the production technology
is very e±cient, the necessary and su±cient condition for the high-powered contract (®¤; ¯¤)
to be self-enforcing is manager ownership of the unit's physical assets.
(B) Next we turn to the question of whether ownership arrangements can ensure self
enforcement of the low-powered contract (w¤ = w0). Under this contract, the production
period payo®s are w0 ¡w1 for the manager and y(se; Ge)¡ w0 + w1 for the HQ.
(B1) Suppose that the HQ owns the physical assets. As in the case of (A2), the manager
and the HQ have, respectively, outside options of ¿w0 and y(se; Ge) ¡ ¿w0. By Proposition
8, the contract is not renegotiated if and only if
w0 ¡ w1 ¸ ¿w0;
y(se; Ge)¡ w0 + w1 ¸ y(se; Ge)¡ ¿w0:
These inequalities imply that w1 = (1¡ ¿ )w0. Note that this condition does not depend on
(se; Ge). In particular, it ensures fs¤; G¤; no renegotiationg as the equilibrium. Thus, the L
contract is self-enforcing if the HQ owns the physical assets.
(B2) Suppose instead that the manager owns the physical assets. As in the case of
(A1), the manager has the outside option of maxf¿w0; y(se; 0)g while the HQ has y(0; Ge)¡
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¿w0. For fs = T ¡ g¤; g = g¤; no renegotiationg to be a subgame perfect equilibrium, by
Proposition 8, the following conditions have to be satis¯ed:
y(T ¡ g¤; 0)  w0 ¡ w1; (9)
¿w0  w0 ¡ w1; (10)
y(0; G¤)¡ ¿w0  y(T ¡ g¤; G¤)¡ w0 + w1: (11)
In addition, w1 has to satisfy
w1 +max
s
fy(s; 0)¡ c(s)g  w0: (12)
Otherwise, the manager could bene¯t from deviation by choosing the sales e®ort that
maximizes y(s; 0) ¡ c(s) and getting a total payo® of w1 + maxsfy(s; 0) ¡ c(s)g > w0.
It is easy to see that (12) implies (9). Therefore, (10)-(12) are necessary conditions for
fT ¡ g¤; g¤; no renegotiationg to be a subgame perfect equilibrium. We can show that they
are also su±cient.
Lemma 9 fT ¡g¤; g¤; no renegotiationg is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if there
exists some w1 satisfying (10)-(12).
However, fT ¡ g¤; g¤; no renegotiationg is not the only subgame perfect equilibrium.
There are other equilibria that are more likely to be selected. We know the second-best
g¤ is chosen to maximize ¼1 = p[y(T ¡ g; pg) ¡ w] + (1 ¡ p)[(1 ¡ ®)y(s; pg) ¡ ¯]: Let g0
be the goodwill e®ort that maximizes y(T ¡ g; pg). It can be shown that g0 < g¤ and
y(T ¡ g0; pg0) > y(T ¡ g¤; pg¤). These inequalities imply that (10)-(12) still hold when g¤ is
replaced by g0. Similar to Lemma 9, we have:
Lemma 10 If there exists some w1 satisfying (10)-(12), then fT ¡ g0; g0; no renegotiationg
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
It remains to be argued that E0 = fT¡g0; g0; no renegotiationg is more likely to be selected
than E¤ = fT ¡ g¤; g¤; no renegotiationg. E0 and E¤ have the same equilibrium payo®s.
However, compared to E¤, E0 gives the manager a higher outside option payo®, yields higher
surplus for the unit, and gives the HQ the same outside option payo®. Therefore, E0 gives
the manager higher o®-equilibrium payo®s than E¤. Note that in the game between the
L manager and the HQ, the manager moves ¯rst by choosing s and g before any possible
renegotiation. If the manager is even slightly concerned about possible uncertainty in the
payo®s, the game form, or the execution of the strategies, she will choose E0 rather than
E¤. In this sense, E0 is more likely to be the outcome of the game. In E0, however, the
second-best e®ort levels are not implemented.
Combining (B1) and (B2), we have:
Proposition 10 The low-powered incentive contract is self-enforcing ex post if and only if
the HQ owns the unit's physical assets.
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Propositions 9 and 10 are established under the assumption that the HQ owns the brand
name in which goodwill e®ort is embedded. This is in fact an optimal arrangement. Following
the logic of the above analysis, we can show that managers with the low-powered incentive
contract should not own any assets, including the brand name. If managers with the high-
powered incentive contract have some claim over the ownership of the brand name, they will
want to renegotiate the low-powered incentive contract, because they are not given any of L
units' revenue under the contract. Therefore, the HQ should be the sole owner of the brand
name.
It is useful to compare self enforcement of high-powered and low-powered incentive con-
tracts with that of performance pay and e±ciency wage contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson
(1996)). In their model, as revenue is unveri¯able, performance contracts may not be self-
enforcing. In our model, the high-powered contracts may not be self-enforcing, because
contracts are incomplete about goodwill. Low-powered contracts, on the other hand, are
similar to e±ciency wage contracts, as neither is contingent on revenue or pro¯t. As shown
by MacLeod and Malcomson (1996), either performance pay contracts or e±ciency wage
contracts are not self-enforcing depending on market conditions, and their relative opti-
mality follows accordingly. In this paper, contract mix is optimal and multiple ownership
arrangements are required to ensure self enforcement of both high-powered and low-powered
contracts.
4.4. Contractual remedies versus ownership arrangement
One may well ask the following question: can contractual remedies mimic the ownership
arrangement to ensure self enforcement of the high-powered contract? Speci¯cally, while
the HQ owns both the unit's physical assets and company goodwill, it could write an ex
ante contract that stipulates a payment (denoted by M) from the HQ to the manager once
the high-powered contract is not enforced.27 Note that the actual sales revenue is no longer
veri¯able when the outside option is taken. This is because the HQ would hire another
manager on a ¯xed-wage contract to ¯nalize the production, and it is impossible for the
court to verify the actual revenue without the help from the HQ or the new manager. Thus,
the HQ's payment to the manager can only be a ¯xed payment depending on the expected
sales revenue.
There are two con°icting concerns when choosing M . First, the manager should be
given incentive to put in sales e®ort. Second, the HQ should ex post prefer enforcement of
the high-powered contract. Speci¯cally, the manager has the option of not putting in any
sales e®ort but still receiving a ¯xed payment M from the HQ. To provide the manager the
e®ort incentive, M¤ < ®¤y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤) is required.28 That, however, implies that the HQ
27The low-powered contract is self-enforcing so long as there is no contractual remedy at all.
28The timing for the lump-sum payment ¯¤ is unimportant to the main results of this subsection.
For simplicity of notations, it is assumed that all of ¯¤ is paid before the renegotiation stage. The
value of the reservation wage does not a®ect the argument either and thus is again assumed to be
0.
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gets more from the outside option than from the high-powered contract (y(s¤; G¤) ¡M ¤ >
(1 ¡ ®¤)y(s¤; G¤)), and the high-powered contract would be renegotiated. Underlying the
above argument is an important feature of the contractual remedies, namely, there is no
automatic loss of surplus when the outside option is taken. In contrast, under the optimal
ownership arrangement for the high-powered contract, there is a loss of surplus upon the
outside option (namely, y(s¤; 0) + y(0; G¤) < y(s¤; G¤)), which is necessary to ensure self
enforcement of the high-powered contract (Proposition 9).
One may further propose the following contractual remedies when the outside option
is taken: the HQ pays M ¤ to the manager and also makes a large enough donation (D¤)
to a third party such that the HQ prefers enforcement of the high-powered contract (i.e.,
y(s¤; G¤) ¡M¤ ¡D¤ < (1¡ ®¤)y(s¤;G¤)). However, under some reasonable circumstances,
the proposed contractual remedies are inferior to the optimal ownership arrangement.
Without losing generality, suppose that, after the manager makes the sales and goodwill
e®orts, she may have to quit the business for some benign (for example, family) reasons
with certain probability. Interestingly, this uncertainty does not present any problem for
the ownership arrangement of the high-powered contract. In case of friendly separation,
the manager could sell her asset to a third party and get her expected payo® ®¤y(s¤; G¤).29
In case of unfriendly separation, the manager gets y(s¤; 0) and the HQ has y(0; G¤), which
prevents renegotiation of the high-powered contract and ensures optimal ex ante incentive
for both parties.
Now, we consider contractual remedies in the presence of possible friendly separation.
Again, payments in the contract have to be ¯xed. One reason is that revenue also becomes
unveri¯able under friendly separation, for a new manager will be hired by the company and
it is impossible for the court to verify the actual revenue without the help from the HQ or
the new manager. A more important reason is that the incumbent manager will not have as
much control over the hiring of the new manager when she does not own any assets as the
control she has over the choice of the buyer of her assets when she owns then.30 In particular,
she will not be given the rights of choosing the new manager and dictating the contract with
the new manager. Only with these rights can she get ®¤y(s¤;G¤) through side payment by
the new manager to her.
The contract should include the following payments: under unfriendly separation, M¤to
the manager and D¤ to a third party; under friendly separation, M ¤¤ to the manager. These
payments should be chosen so that (1) neither party would initiate the unfriendly separation,
and (2) friendly separation is allowed to occur when there are good reasons for the manager
to initiate it. (1) implies that payments (M ¤; D¤) would not be invoked. However, (2)
implies that the ¯xed paymentM ¤¤ would be invoked with a positive probability. Note that,
29Note that for the sale of the assets to go through, revenue does not need to be veri¯able.
However, for a contract contingent on revenue to be enforceable, revenue needs to be veri¯able. See
Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) for empirical evidence on the franchisees' sales of their assets.
In general, the partner's right to sell his/her assets is well protected by law, though the sale often
needs to be ¯rst o®ered to other partners (see for example Lynch (1989)).
30Hiring employees is a residual right of control that can not be contracted on.
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whenever the manager is expected to get ¯xed payo® (in the event of friendly separation)
with positive probability, the ex ante e®ort incentive will be adversely a®ected. Thus, there
is a tension between adequate protection in case of friendly separation and proper ex ante
incentive. In contrast, the ownership arrangement of the high-powered contract provides the
manager with payo®s that are contingent upon both the manager's e®ort and the nature of
the separation.
In summary, given there is severe contractual incompleteness in franchising, the incentive
contracts of various power can only be voluntarily enforced in the presence of the correspond-
ing ownership arrangements of the units' physical assets.
5. Conclusion
The contract mix and multiple ownership structure in a franchise both challenge the recent
developments in the theory of the ¯rm. With the observation that system-wide goodwill
and unit-speci¯c sales activity are crucial to a franchise company, we construct a multi-task
model in which one task has the feature of the public good and the other has that of the
private good. We show that, when the two tasks are complementary, the principal should
o®er a ¯xed-wage contract to some agents and a revenue-sharing contract to the remaining
agents. In addition, by incorporating the stylized feature of contractual incompleteness in
a franchise and possible ex post unenforceability of ex ante incentive contracts, we show
that the ex ante incentive contracts of various power can be made self-enforcing only by the
corresponding ownership arrangements.
This paper thus provides the ¯rst theory that explains both contract mix and multiple
ownership structure in the franchise. More importantly, it adopts and extends important
features from both the multi-task theory and the incomplete-contract theory of the ¯rm.
On the one hand, by incorporating the task of the public-good nature, it makes it possible
for the multi-task model to explain the optimality of contract mix for ex ante homogeneous
agents. On the other hand, it considers ex ante revenue-sharing contracts in settings of
contractual incompleteness and explores other roles of ownership structures. In particular,
the optimality of the contract mix in the presence of a multi-task framework implies multiple
ownership arrangements of complementary assets.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The HQ should request the same level of goodwill e®ort from all
managers of L units.
Let fg(j)gj2L be a pro¯le of goodwill e®ort levels and g ´ RL g(j)dj=p, the average of
fg(j)gj2L. Since y(s;G) is concave in s, y(T ¡ g;G) is concave is g. Then by Jensen's
Inequality, Z
L
y(T ¡ g(j);G)dj 
Z
L
y(T ¡ g;G)dj:
Therefore, the solution to program (OP ¡ G) is to choose g(j) to be a constant. That is,
The HQ should request the same level of goodwill e®ort from all managers of L units.
Proof of Lemma 1: Program (OP ¡HQ0) is equivalent to
max py(T ¡ g;G) + RI¡L[y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 12r¾2®(i)2]di (OP ¡HQ00)
s:t: pyG(T ¡ Gp ; G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ; G) +
R
I¡L(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G)di ¸ 0 (IC ¡G)
®(i)ys(s(i);G) = c
0(s(i)) (IC ¡ s)
Let us consider program (OP ¡HQ0). Assumptions 1 and 3 say that y(s;G) is concave in
s and lims!0 ys(s;G) = 1. Therefore, incentive compatibility constraint (OP ¡ s) can be
replaced by
®(i)ys(s(i); G) = c
0(s(i)):
By Proposition 1, incentive compatibility constraint (OP ¡G) becomes
g = argmax
g
py(T ¡ G
p
;G) +
Z
I¡L
[(1¡ ®(i))y(s(i); G)¡ ¯(i)]di;
where, G = pg. It is easy to show that, since y(s;G) is concave in (s;G),
py(T ¡ G
p
;G) +
Z
I¡L
[(1¡ ®(i))y(s(i); G)¡ ¯(i)]di
is concave in G. Its derivative with respect to G is
pyG(T ¡ G
p
;G)¡ ys(T ¡ G
p
;G) +
Z
I¡L
(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G)di;
which decreases with G, by Assumption 3, goes to 1 as G ! 0, and goes to ¡1 as G! pT .
Therefore, (OP ¡G) can be replaced by
pyG(T ¡ G
p
;G)¡ ys(T ¡ G
p
;G) +
Z
I¡L
(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G)di = 0: (FOC ¡G)
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The objective function of program (OP ¡HQ0) is now
py(T ¡ g;G) +
Z
I¡L
[y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2]di;
which is also concave in G and the derivative of which with respect to G is positive for G
satisfying constraint (FOC ¡G). Therefore, program (OP ¡HQ0) can be rewritten as
max py(T ¡ g;G) + RI¡L[y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 12r¾2®(i)2]di (OP ¡HQ00)
s:t: pyG(T ¡ Gp ; G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ; G) +
R
I¡L(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G)di ¸ 0 (IC ¡G)
®(i)ys(s(i);G) = c
0(s(i)) (IC ¡ s)
When we change the equality sign in (FOC ¡G) to ¸ in (IC ¡G), we expand the feasible
region of program (OP ¡ HQ0) to the left along the G-direction, as the left hand side of
(FOC ¡ G) decreases with G. This does not change the optimum because the objective
function of (OP ¡HQ0) increases with G in the expanded feasible region.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let ®(i) = c0(s)=ys(s;G). Then, given G, the integrand in the objective
function of program (OP ¡HQ00),
y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2;
and the integrand in constraint (IC ¡G),
(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G);
are both concave functions of s(i).
Let Á(s;G) ´ c0(s)=ys(s;G). Then (IC ¡ s) implies ®(i) = Á(s(i); G), which by Assumption
4 is convex in s(i). Substitute ®(i) = Á(s(i); G) into the objective function and constraint
(IC ¡G). Then the integrand in the objective function,
y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2;
becomes a concave function of s(i). The integrand in constraint (IC ¡G),
(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G);
is also concave in s(i) in the convex range fs(i) : c0(s(i))=ys(s(i); G)  1g, because (1¡®(i))
is non-negative, concave and decreasing in s(i), and yG(s(i); G) is, by Assumption 5, positive,
concave and increasing in s(i); the product of two non-negative concave functions is concave
if one of them is increasing and the other decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 2: The HQ should o®er the same high-powered contract to all managers
of H units.
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Given a pro¯le of sales e®ort levels, fs(i)gi2I¡L, let s ´ RI¡L s(i)di=(1¡ p), the average of
fs(i)gi2I¡L. Then, for any given G, Jensen's inequality impliesZ
I¡L
[y(s(i); G)¡ c(s(i))¡ 1
2
r¾2®(i)2]di 
Z
I¡L
y(s;G)¡ c(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2®2di;
and
pyG(T ¡ Gp ;G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ;G) +
R
I¡L(1¡ ®(i))yG(s(i); G)di
 pyG(T ¡ Gp ;G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ;G) +
R
I¡L(1¡ ®)yG(s;G)di;
where ® = Á(s;G). Therefore, choosing the same ® and s for all managers of H units is
better than choosing di®erent ones. That is, the HQ should o®er the same high-powered
contract to all managers of H units.
Proof of Lemma 4: s and G are continuous functions of (®; p) on [0; 1]2.
By Lemma 3, we only need to show continuity (1) at ® = 0 and (2) at p = 0.
(1) We ¯rst prove that lim(®;p)!(0;p0) s(®; p) = T , for all p0. By (FOC ¡ s),
®ys(s(®; p); G) = c
0(s(®; p)):
Therefore,
0  c0(s(®; p))¡ c0(T ) = ®ys(s(®; p); G)  ®ys(T; T ) ! 0
as ® ! 0. The last inequality holds because s(®; p) ¸ T , G  T , and ys(s;G) increases
with G but decreases with s. Since c00 > 0 as t > T , (c0)¡1 is continuous in [0;1) with
(c0)¡1(0) = T . Therefore, c0(s(®; p)) ¡ c0(T ) ! 0 implies lim(®;p)!(0;p0) s(®; p) = T . The
de¯nition of s(0; p0) implies that s(0; p0) = T . Therefore, s is continuous at ® = 0.
When p > 0,
@2¦1
@G2
= pyLGG ¡ 2yLsG +
1
p
yLss + (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yHGG < 0
by (FOC ¡ G) and the concavity of y, where a function with a superscript H (L, resp.)
means that it is evaluated at (s;G) ((T ¡ G
p
; G), resp.). Therefore (FOC¡G) implies G is a
di®erentiable function of (s; ®; p) when p > 0, by the Implicit Function Theorem. Since we
have shown that s is continuous at ® = 0, so is G.
When p = 0,
G(®; p)¡G(0; 0) = pg ! 0:
Note that the above argument also showed the continuity of s and G at (®; p) = (0; 0). (2)
First, G is continuous at p = 0 because G(®; 0) = 0 for all ® and
G(®; p) = pg(®; p)  pT ! 0 as p! 0; for all ®:
s(®; p) is de¯ned by
®ys(s(®; p); G)¡ c0(s(®; p)) = 0:
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At (®0 6= 0; p = 0),
®0ys(s(®0; 0); 0)¡ c0(s(®0; 0)) = 0:
If ys(T; 0) 6= 0, then s(®0; 0) > T and thus ®0yss(s(®0; 0); 0) ¡ c00(s(®0; 0)) < 0. By the
Implicit Function Theorem, s is a continuous function of (®;G) at (®0 6= 0; p = 0). Since we
have shown that G is continuous at p = 0, s is also continuous at p = 0.
If ys(T; 0) = 0, then s(®
0; 0) = T for all ®0.
jc0(s(®; p))¡ c0(T )j = ®ys(s(®; p); G(®; p))  ®ys(T;G(®; p))! 0 as p ! 0:
Since (c0)¡1 is continuous in [0;1) with (c0)¡1(0) = T , s(®; p) ! T as (®; p) ! (®0; 0), i.e.,
s is continuous at p = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: For any p 2 [0; 1), the optimal ® 2 (0; 1).
When p = 0, ® is chosen to maximize
max y(s; 0)¡ c(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2®2
s:t: ®ys(s; 0)¡ c0(s) = 0:
Apply the implicit function theorem to the constraint. We have,
ds
d®
=
ys
®(c00(s)¡ yss) > 0 for ® > 0:
Then,
d¼
d®
= (ys ¡ c0) dsd® ¡ r¾2®
= (1¡ ®)ys dsd® ¡ r¾2®
= 1¡®
®
y2s
c00¡yss ¡ r¾2®:
Therefore, as ® ! 0, d¼
d®
! 1, and at ® = 1, d¼
d®
= ¡r¾2® < 0. Consequently, the optimal
® 2 (0; 1).
Now consider p 2 (0; 1). At ® = 1, (2) becomes
d¦0
d®
= ¡(1¡ p)r¾2 + (1¡ p)yHG
dG
d®
:
Apply the implicit function theorem to (FOC ¡ s) and (FOC ¡G). We have, at ® = 1,
dG
d®
=
1
jJj(1¡ p)y
H
G (y
H
ss ¡ c00);
where, the Jacobian matrix
J =
Ã ¡c00(s) 0
0 pyLGG ¡ 2yLsG + 1pyLss
!
+
Ã
®yHss ®y
H
sG
(1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yHsG (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yHGG
!
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has positive determinant. Therefore, at ® = 1, dG
d®
< 0, which implies that d¦0
d®
< 0. Thus
the optimal ® is not 1.
As ® ! 0,
ds
d®
! ¡ 1jJjyHs [pyLGG ¡ 2yLsG + 1pyLss + (1¡ p)yHGG] > 0;
dG
d®
! 1jJ j(1¡ p)yHsGyHs > 0:
These imply that lim®!0 d¦0d® > 0. Therefore, the optimal ® is not 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: For any given p 2 (0; 1), ¼L < ¼H at the corresponding HQ's optimal
choice of ®, denoted by ®¤(p).
By the de¯nition of ¼L,
¼L(® = ®¤(p)) = y(T ¡ g(®¤); pg(®¤))  max
g
y(T ¡ g; pg):
Since y(s;G) increases with s and p < 1,
max
g
y(T ¡ g; pg) < max
g
py(T ¡ g; pg) + (1¡ p)y(T; pg) = ¼(® = 0):
By the de¯nition of ®¤(p),
¼(® = 0)  ¼(® = ®¤(p)) = p¼L(® = ®¤(p)) + (1¡ p)¼H(® = ®¤(p)):
Combining the above three inequalities, we have:
¼L(® = ®¤(p)) < p¼L(® = ®¤(p)) + (1¡ p)¼H(® = ®¤(p));
which implies that ¼L(® = ®¤(p)) < ¼H(® = ®¤(p)).
Proof of Lemma 5: If y(s; 0) 6= 0, then limp!0 @¦0@p > 0 for ® < 1.
If y(s; 0) is not always zero, then the concavity, the monotonicity, and the non- negativity
of y implies that y(s; 0) > 0 for all s > 0. Let ® < 1. By (3),
d¦0
dp
= (¼L ¡ ¼H) + gyLs + (1¡ p)®yHG
@G
@p
+ (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yHs
@s
@p
:
(FOC ¡G) implies that,
ys(T ¡ g;G) ¸ (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yG(s;G):
Since s ¸ T and ysG > 0,
(1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yG(s;G) ¸ (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yG(T;G);
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the right hand side of which ! 1 because G = pg  pT , and Assumption 3 says that
limG!0 yG = 1. Therefore, ys(T ¡ g;G) ! 1, which implies g ! T . Then, by Assumption
6, the substitution e®ect in (3), gyLs ! 1;
lim
p!0 gy
L
s = T limp!0 ys(T ¡ g;G) = T lim(s;G)!(0;0) ys(s;G) = 1:
In (3), ¼L ¡ ¼H is bounded. Then to determine the sign of d¦0
dp
as p ! 0, it is su±cient to
show that @G
@p
> 0 and @s
@p
> 0 as p ! 0. By Lemma 3, it su±ces to show that @2¦1
@p@G
> 0.
Substitute (FOC ¡G) into @2¦1
@p@G
and rearrange. Then
(1¡ p) @
2¦1
@p@G
= yLG + (1¡ p)gyLsG ¡
(1¡ p)
p
gyLss ¡ yLs ; (A1)
in which only the last term is negative. By Assumption 6, ys is weakly convex. Then
ys(T;G)¡ ys(T ¡ g;G) ¸ gyss(T ¡ g;G);
in which ys(T ¡ g;G) ! 1. Therefore,
¡gyLss = ¡gyss(T ¡ g;G)! 1:
Rearranging (A1) yields
(1¡ p) @2¦1
@p@G
= yLG + (1¡ p)gyLsG ¡ (1¡2p)p gyLss ¡ gyss(T ¡ g;G)¡ yLs
¸ yLG + (1¡ p)gyLsG ¡ (1¡2p)p gyLss ¡ ys(T;G) ! 1:
In summary, we have shown limp!0 @¦0@p > 0 for ® < 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: It is optimal for the company to have some L units.
Corollary 1 says that the optimal (®; p) exists. Let it be (®¤; p¤). We wish to show
that p¤ > 0. Suppose instead that p¤ = 0. By Proposition 4, ®¤ < 1. By Lemma 5,
limp!0 @¦0@p (®¤; p) > 0. Thus there exists some positive p such that ¦0(®¤; p) > ¦0(®¤; p¤).
This is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6: It is more likely for the HQ to have H units when the managers are
less risk averse, or when the uncertainty about the revenue is smaller, or when marginal cost
of e®ort is smaller.
We ¯rst consider the optimal choice of ® and s when only an in¯nitesimal proportion of
units are given H contracts, i.e., p = 1. In this case, (FOC ¡G) becomes
yG(T ¡G;G)¡ ys(T ¡G;G) = 0;
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which implies that G does not depend on ®. Therefore, ® is chosen to
¼H = max y(s;G)¡Kc(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2®2
s:t: ®ys(s;G)¡Kc0(s) = 0 (IC)
where K is a cost parameter.
The Lagrangian of the program that chooses the optimal ® and s is
L = y(s;G)¡Kc(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2®2 + ¸[®ys(s;G)¡Kc0(s)]:
Di®erentiation yields
@L
@®
= ¡r¾2® + ¸ys(s;G);
@L
@s
= (1¡ ®)ys(s;G) + ¸[®yss(s;G)¡Kc00(s)]:
By the incentive compatibility constraint, s ¸ T > 0. Therefore, @L
@s
= 0. If ® = 1, then
@L
@s
= 0 implies ¸ = 0, which in turn implies @L
@®
< 0. This is a contradiction. If ® = 0, the
incentive compatibility constraint implies that s = T . Therefore, @L
@s
= ys(T;G) > 0. This
is again a contradiction. Therefore, the optimal ® 2 (0; 1) and @L
@®
= 0, which implies that
¸ > 0 and the optimal s > T .
By the envelope theorem, we have, d¼
H
dr
= ¡1
2
¾2®2 < 0, d¼
H
d¾
= ¡r¾®2 < 0 and d¼H
dK
=
¡c(s)¡ ¸c0(s) < 0.
Since at p = 1, ¼L = y(T ¡ G;G) and gyLs = Gys(T ¡ G;G) do not depend on ¾ or K,
the proposition follows from equation (3) and the above results.
Proof of Proposition 7: It is more likely for the HQ to have H units when T is smaller.
This proposition needs additional assumptions:
y(s; 0) > 0 for s > 0 and lim
(s;G)!(0;0)
GyG(s;G) = 0: (A2)
Suppose the cost function is now c = c(s+g¡T ) with c being strictly increasing and convex.
It su±ces to show that d¼
dp
jp=1< 0 for su±ciently small T . As T ! 0, ¼L = y(T ¡ g; T ) !
y(0; 0). When p = 1, gyLs = Gys(T ¡G;G). By (FOC ¡G), This is GyG(T ¡G;G), which,
by Assumption (A2), approaches 0 as both G and T go to 0.
¼H = max® y(s;G)¡ c(s¡ T )¡ 12r¾2®2
s:t: ®ys(s;G)¡ c0(s¡ T ) = 0:
As T ! 0, ¼H approaches,
¼H(T = 0) = max® y(s; 0)¡ c(s)¡ 12r¾2®2
s:t: ®ys(s; 0)¡ c0(s) = 0;
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which is independent of T and greater than y(0; 0). Therefore,
lim
T!0
d¼
dp
jp=1= y(0; 0)¡ ¼H(T = 0) < 0;
that is, d¼
dp
jp=1< 0 for su±ciently small T .
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose that the manager owns the physical asset. The H contract is
self-enforcing if conditions
max
s
fy(s; 0)¡ c(s)g+ w1  ®¤y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤) + ¯¤ = w0; (6)
¿w0 + w1 < ®
¤y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤) + ¯¤ = w0; (7)
max
g
fpy(T ¡ g; pg) + (1¡ p)y(0; pg)g 
py(T ¡ g¤; G¤) + (1¡ p)[y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤)] + (1¡ p)(w1 + ¿w0 ¡ w0): (8)
are met.
To make the ex ante contract (®¤; ¯¤) self-enforcing in the incomplete-contracting framework,
we need to prove: (1) given that (s¤; G¤) is chosen the contract is not renegotiated at t = 2,
and (2) (s¤; G¤) is an Nash equilibrium when the managers choose e®ort levels at t = 1 in
anticipation of possible renegotiation of the contract. Note that part (1) is met under the
following conditions:
®¤y(s¤; G¤) + (¯¤ ¡ w1) ¸ y(s¤; 0); (A3)
®¤y(s¤; G¤) + (¯¤ ¡ w1) ¸ ¿w0; (A4)
(1¡ ®¤)y(s¤; G¤)¡ (¯¤ ¡ w1) ¸ y(0; G¤)¡ ¿w0: (A5)
It is easy to show that (A3), (A4) and (A5) are implied by (6), (7) and (8), respectively.
Now we consider the investment stage to show that (s¤; G¤) is an Nash equilibrium. We
¯rst consider the manager's sales e®ort given the goodwill e®ort G¤.
1. If the manager chooses s¤, then renegotiation does not occur under (A3) - (A5). Her
total payo® is ®¤y(s¤; G¤) ¡ c(s¤) + ¯¤ = w0 31 due to the individual rationality con-
straint.
2. If the manager deviates by choosing s0, then her total payo® is
(a) ®¤y(s0; G¤)¡ c(s0) + ¯¤ if s0 does not lead to renegotiation.
31As there is no contract renegotiation, the manager's total payo® is equal to w1 from the HQ
before the realization of the revenue plus ®¤y(s¤;G¤)+(¯¤¡w1) from the HQ after the realization
minus her e®ort cost c(s¤).
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(b) y(s0; 0)¡ c(s0) + w1 if y(s0; 0) > maxf®¤y(s0; G¤) + (¯¤ ¡ w1); ¿w0g (the manager
initiates renegotiation by threatening to work for herself).
(c) ¿w0 ¡ c(s0) + w1 if ¿wo > maxf®¤y(s0;G¤) + (¯¤ ¡ w1); y(s0; 0)g (the manager
initiates renegotiation by threatening to work for others).
(d) y(s0; G¤)¡y(0;G¤)+¿w0¡c(s0)+w1 if y(0; G¤)¡¿w0 > (1¡®¤)y(s0; G¤)¡(¯¤¡w1)
(the HQ initiates renegotiation).
To induce the manager to make the second-best sales e®ort s¤, we need to ensure that,
given the goodwill e®ort G¤, her payo® when choosing s¤ is higher than that when choosing
s0. Note that, by the de¯nition of s¤ in Section 3, ®¤y(s0;G¤) ¡ c(s0) + ¯¤  ®¤y(s¤; G¤) ¡
c(s¤) + ¯¤, which implies that the manager does not bene¯t from deviation 2(a). Condition
(6) ensures that deviation 2(b) is not worthwhile. The manager will not take deviation 2(c)
if ¿wo ¡ c(s0) +w1  ®¤y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤) + ¯¤; which is guaranteed by (7). Finally, deviation
2(d) is not pro¯table as y(s0; G¤) ¡ y(0; G¤) + ¿w0 ¡ c(s0) + w1 < ®¤y(s0;G¤) ¡ c(s0) + ¯¤;
and the same logic for the inferiority of 2(a) applies.
We next consider the HQ's e®ort choice given the sales e®ort s¤:
1. If the HQ chooses G¤, then renegotiation does not occur under (A3) - (A5). Its total
payo® is p[y(T ¡ g¤; G¤)¡ w0] + (1¡ p)[(1¡ ®¤)y(s¤; G¤)¡ ¯¤].
2. If the HQ deviates by choosing G0 = pg0, then its total payo® is
(a) p[y(T ¡ g0; G0)¡w0] + (1¡ p)[(1¡ ®¤)y(s¤; G0)¡ ¯¤] if G0 does not lead to rene-
gotiation.
(b) p[y(T ¡ g0;G0) ¡ w0] + (1 ¡ p)[y(0; G0) ¡ ¿w0 ¡ w1] if y(0; G0) ¡ ¿w0 > (1 ¡
®¤)y(s¤; G0) ¡ (¯¤ ¡ w1) (the HQ initiates renegotiation).
(c) p[y(T ¡ g0; G0)¡ w0] + (1¡ p)[y(s¤; G0)¡maxfy(s¤; 0); ¿w0g ¡ w1]
if maxfy(s¤; 0); ¿w0g > ®¤y(s¤; G0) + (¯¤ ¡ w1) (the manager initiates renegotia-
tion).
To induce the HQ to make the second-best goodwill e®ort G¤, we need to ensure that,
given the sales e®ort s¤, its payo® from choosing G¤ is higher than that from choosing
G0. Note that, by the de¯nition of G¤ in Section 3, it is not pro¯table for the HQ to have
deviation 2(a). The HQ's payo® under deviation 2(c) is even lower than that under deviation
2(a), which implies that deviation 2(c) is unpro¯table either. Finally, deviation 2(b) is not
worthwhile if
max
g
fpy(T ¡ g; pg) + (1¡ p)[y(0; pg)¡ ¿w0 ¡ w1]g
 py(T ¡ g¤; G¤) + (1¡ p)[(1¡ ®¤)y(s¤;G¤)¡ ¯¤]
= py(T ¡ g¤; G¤) + (1¡ p)[y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤)]¡ (1¡ p)w0;
which is guaranteed by (8).
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Proof of Lemma 7: Let k1 = k2 = 0. Then for su±ciently large k, there exists some w1 such
that (6)-(8) hold with strict inequality.
With k1 = k2 = 0, (6)-(8) become:
w1  w0;
¿w0 + w1  w0;
max
g
pkz(T ¡ g;G)  pkz(T ¡ g¤; G¤) + (1¡ p)[kz(s¤;G¤)¡ c(s¤)] + (1¡ p)(w1 + ¿w0 ¡w0):
Choose w1 = (1¡ ¿ )w0 ¡ ² for some ² > 0. Then the ¯rst two inequalities hold strictly. The
third inequality, divided by k, becomes:
max
g
pz(T ¡ g;G)  pz(T ¡ g¤; G¤) + (1¡ p)
Ã
z(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s
¤)
k
!
¡ 1
k
(1¡ p)²; (80):
The left-hand-side of (80) is bounded from above by z(T; T ). If we can show pz(T ¡g¤; G¤)+
(1¡ p)
³
z(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤)
k
´
! 1 as k ! 1, then (80) holds for su±ciently large k.
Consider the HQ's optimization problem:
maxp;® ¼0 = pz
³
T ¡ G
p
; G
´
+ (1¡ p)
³
z(s;G)¡ c(s)
k
´
s:t: ®kzs(s;G)¡ c0(s) = 0 (FOC ¡ s)
pzG(T ¡ Gp ; G)¡ zs(T ¡ Gp ; G) + (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)zG(s;G) = 0 (FOC ¡G)
Let us ¯rst ¯x p 2 (0; 1) and ® 2 (0; 1). From (FOC ¡ s) and (FOC ¡G), it is a standard
exercise to show that ds
dk
> 0 and dG
dk
> 0. (The computation is similar to that of dG
d®
in the
proof of Proposition 3.) Then ®z(s;G) ¡ c(s)
k
increases with k, because its derivative with
respect to k is, by the envelope theorem, ®zG
dG
dk
+ c(s)
k2
> 0. Furthermore, limk!1 s = 1.
Otherwise, limk!1 s = s1 < 1, and ®zs(s1; G1) = limk!1 c(s)k = 0 by (FOC¡s). This is a
contradiction because zsG > 0. Therefore, z(s;G)¡ c(s)k = (1¡®)z(s;G)+
³
®z(s;G)¡ c(s)
k
´
!
1 as k ! 1. In summary, we have shown that for ¯xed p and ®, the HQ's objective function
¼0 ! 1 as k ! 1. It follows immediately that when p and ® are optimally chosen, ¼0 is
even larger.
Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose for some k and w1, (6)-(8) hold with strict inequality as k1 =
k2 = 0. Then (6)-(8) also hold for su±ciently small k1 and k2.
The conclusion about (6) and (7) is very easy to see. The left-hand-side of (8) is l(p; k1; k2) ´
maxgfpy(T¡g; pg)+(1¡p)y(0; pg)g. By the \theorem of the maximum" (Berge (1963)), the
optimal g is an upper hemi-continuous function of (p; k1; k2) and thus l(p; k1; k2) is continuous
in (p; k1; k2). On the right-hand-side of (8),
p(T ¡ g¤;G¤) + (1¡ p)[y(s¤; G¤)¡ c(s¤)] =
max py(T ¡ G
p
; G) + (1¡ p)[y(s;G)¡ c(s)] (OP ¡HQ3)
s:t: ®ys(s;G)¡ c0(s) = 0 (FOC ¡ s)
pyG(T ¡ Gp ;G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ;G) + (1¡ p)(1¡ ®)yG(s;G) = 0 (FOC ¡G)
38
To prove the inequality, we ¯rst perform an exercise similar to Lemmas 1 and 2. Let Á(s;G) ´
c0(s)=ys(s;G). Then (FOC ¡ s) becomes ® = Á(s;G). By Assumption 4, Á is convex in s.
Substitute ® = Á(s;G) into the objective function and constraint (FOC¡G) in (OP¡HQ3).
Then (OP ¡HQ3) becomes
max py(T ¡ G
p
; G) + (1¡ p)[y(s;G)¡ c(s)¡ 1
2
r¾2Á(s;G)2] (OP ¡HQ4)
s:t: pyG(T ¡ Gp ; G)¡ ys(T ¡ Gp ; G) + (1¡ p)(1¡ Á(s;G))yG(s;G) ¸ 0 (FOC ¡G)
The reason why we can change the equality in (FOC ¡G) to inequality is the same as that
o®ered in Lemma 1. Now, given (p;G), (OP ¡HQ4) is a concave program that chooses the
optimal s. The solution s = s(p;G; k1; k2) is di®erentiable. Substitute the solution into the
objective function. We have an unconstrained optimization problem32
max
p;G
f(p;G; k1; k2);
where f is di®erentiable. Again, by the \theorem of the maximum", (p;G) are upper hemi-
continuous functions of (k1; k2); that is
S ´ f(p;G; k1; k2) : (p;G) = argmax
p;G
f(p;G; k1; k2)g
is a closed set.
Now, we are ready to prove (8) by contradiction. Denote the left (right)-hand side
of (8) by LHS (RHS). Suppose there exists a sequence (pn; Gn; k1n; k2n) 2 S such that
limn!1(pn; Gn; k1n; k2n) = (p0; G0; 0; 0) 2 S, and limn!1(LHS ¡RHS) ¸ 0. Then,
lim
n!1LHS = l(p0; 0; 0);
lim
n!1RHS = p0y(T ¡ g0; G0) + (1¡ p)[y(s0; G0)¡ c(s0)] + (1¡ p)(w1 + ¿w0 ¡ w0):
Lemma 7 says that limn!1LHS < limn!1RHS; i.e., (8) holds with strict inequality as
k1 = k2 = 0. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 9: fT ¡g¤; g¤; no renegotiationg is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only
if there exists some w1 satisfying (10)-(12).
By (12), the manager will not choose s > T because such a costly action does not improve
her payo®. (12) also implies that y(T; 0)  w0 ¡ w1. Therefore, if the manager chooses
s  T , her outside option payo® will not be greater than her payo® under the contract
and hence she will not be in a position to initiate renegotiation. Given other L manager's
choice of g = g¤, (11) implies that the HQ will not want to renegotiate the contract either
for s ¸ T ¡ g¤. Therefore, the manager's payo®s are the same for all s 2 [T ¡ g¤; T ]. For
s < T ¡ g¤, the total surplus y(s;G¤) is smaller than that for s = T ¡ g¤, and thus the
manager cannot be better-o® than choosing s = T ¡ g¤.
32The constraint that p 2 [0; 1] does not a®ect the argument and is thus omitted.
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